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Revisiting the Picture-Superiority Effect in Symbolic Comparisons:
Do Pictures Provide Privileged Access?
Paul C. Amrhein and Mark A. McDaniel
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Paula Waddill
Murray State University
In 4 experiments, symbolic comparisons were investigated to test semantic-memory retrieval accounts
espousing processing advantages for picture over word stimuli. In Experiment 1, participants judged pairs
of animal names or pictures by responding to questions probing concrete or abstract attributes (texture
or size, ferocity or intelligence). Per pair, attributes were salient or nonsalient concerning their prerated
relevance to animals being compared. Distance (near or far) between attribute magnitudes was also
varied. Pictures did not significantly speed responding relative to words across all other variables.
Advantages were found for far attribute magnitudes (i.e., the distance effect) and salient attributes. The
distance effect was much less for salient than nonsalient concrete-attribute comparisons. These results
were consistently found in additional experiments with increased statistical power to detect modality
effects. Our findings argue against dual-coding and some common-code accounts of conceptual attribute
processing, urging reexamination of the assumption that pictures confer privileged access to long-term
knowledge.
A central assumption that has apparently become accepted in
theorizing about semantic-memory activation and retrieval of
knowledge is that pictorial stimuli more readily contact semantic
memory than do verbal stimuli (e.g., Arieh & Algom, 2002;
Glaser, 1992; Shaki & Algom, 2002). Theories of semantic mem-
ory vary in terms of the extent to which the picture advantage
generalizes across varying types of semantic features, however,
most theories share the view that at least for some kinds of
features, pictures confer privileged access. The basis for this
widespread assumption is the experimental finding that latencies to
respond to a judgment based on long-term knowledge are faster
when pictures are presented than when words are presented (Banks
& Flora, 1977; Paivio, 1978; Paivio & Marschark, 1980; Potter &
Faulconer, 1975; Seifert, 1997; Smith & Magee, 1980). This
picture-superiority effect is typically viewed as an established
finding in the speeded picture–word processing literature (e.g.,
Glaser, 1992).
The picture-superiority effect in contacting meaning may be
suspect, however. For example, Theios and Amrhein (1989b)
found that by matching picture and word stimuli for area and
horizontal visual angle, modality differences did not occur in a
semantic-comparison task. Theios and Amrhein (1989b) argued
that such results undermine the interpretation of most of the results
ostensibly supporting the position that pictures have privileged
access to semantic memory (e.g., Potter & Faulconer, 1975; Smith
& Magee, 1980). One should note, however, that the Theios and
Amrhein (1989b) findings do not unequivocally undercut the con-
clusions of the existing database (e.g., see Seifert, 1997). Theios
and Amrhein (1989a, 1989b) used stimuli for which the lexical
referents could be realized in primitive pictorial formats (e.g.,
AAAA is pictured for the word horizontal and EEEEEEE is
pictured for the word CIRCLES). It is not certain that their results
extend to the kinds of concrete nouns (e.g., ELEPHANT, TIGER)
and complex representational pictures (e.g., as found in Snodgrass
& Vanderwart, 1980) that are typically used in the research in-
forming long-term memory representation and access. For exam-
ple, using representational pictures, Seifert (1997) found a picture-
superiority effect (averaging approximately 75 ms) for category
decisions when the visual angles subtended by word and picture
stimuli were similar. Thus, it remains an open issue as to whether
prior results suggesting stimulus-modality differences in the speed
of access to semantic features should be reinterpreted in light of
Theios and Amrhein’s (1989a, 1989b) criticisms.
In four experiments, we addressed this critical issue of whether
picture-superiority effects assumed by prominent theories of
semantic-memory representation and access would be obtained
with standard representational pictures and referents (like those
used in the typical semantic-memory-judgment paradigms) when
picture and word stimuli are controlled for horizontal visual angle.
We chose the symbolic-comparison task to investigate the pres-
ence of picture-superiority effects in accessing semantic memory.
In the usual implementation of this task, pairs of words or pictures
denoting natural concepts are presented, and the participant judges
which pair correctly answers the question posed for a given pair,
such as “Which animal is larger in real life?” or “Which animal is
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more ferocious?” We focused on the symbolic-comparison task for
several important reasons. First, large and robust picture-
superiority effects have been reported for this task, and these
effects have provided key support for the view that pictures have
privileged access to semantic-memory representations (e.g., Banks
& Flora, 1977; Paivio, 1975). We reasoned that the magnitude of
the reported picture-superiority effect in this paradigm (typically
on the order of hundreds of milliseconds) allows the possibility
that a true picture superiority in accessing memory representations
is reflected, along with an artifactual contribution as described
above. That is, the size of the reported effects has been such that
even if these effects were in part artifactual, a reduction in the
effect (through eliminating the artifactual contribution) could still
leave room for a detectable picture-superiority effect.
For our purposes, a second advantage of the symbolic-
comparison task over other semantic-judgment tasks (e.g., catego-
rization; Potter & Faulconer, 1975) is that it provides constraints
that direct how conceptual comparisons are made by explicitly
singling out specific attribute dimensions (e.g., attribute concrete-
ness). Prominent approaches to knowledge representation make
different assumptions regarding the extent to which privileged
access for pictures extends across these attribute dimensions. Thus,
any convincing test of picture-superiority effects must be sensitive
to these different theoretical possibilities. Finally, there is a well-
established literature on the symbolic-comparison task providing
hallmark findings that are useful as comparisons for the present
results. If we obtain these standard findings, then an absence of
picture-superiority effects could not be discounted because of
possible anomalies in our instantiation of the paradigm.
One general position assumes that pictures contact meaning
faster than do words, with no distinction made as to the types of
features comprising this meaning (for ease of exposition we label
this the common code view). That is, in this view, pictures should
provide quicker access to both concrete and abstract features than
should words (Banks & Flora, 1977; Nelson, Reed, & McEvoy,
1977; Potter & Faulconer, 1975; Smith & Magee, 1980). In this
assumption, the reaction times to perform a symbolic comparison
should be faster for pictures than for words. As noted above, this
kind of finding has been reported (e.g., Banks & Flora, 1977), but
its interpretation is uncertain because of possible confounds with
stimulus modality and visual angle.
Other theoretical positions also assume faster meaning access
for pictures but in a more restricted fashion. Dual-coding theory
(Paivio, 1986) posits that concrete features are stored in a nonver-
bal system,1 whereas abstract features are stored in a verbal sys-
tem. Further, pictures as stimuli will make contact with concrete
features more readily than will word stimuli. Briefly, the logic for
this assumption is that pictures but not words are akin to the
imagery code presumed to support the nonverbal system. Recent
findings from the event related potential literature have provided
some support for this multiple-semantic-systems view (e.g., Fed-
ermeier & Kutas, 2001; Kounios & Holcomb, 1994). According to
dual-coding theory, pictures should produce faster responses rel-
ative to words for concrete but not abstract features. Therefore, if
the visual area of the word and picture stimuli were equated, then
the advantage for pictures might be completely eliminated for
abstract dimensions but should remain for concrete features.
A modification to the dual-coding position suggests the possi-
bility of a slight alteration in the pattern of picture-superiority
effects outlined above. Paivio (1978; see also Paivio & Marschark,
1980) speculated that decisions about abstract features like intel-
ligence might be based in large part on access to concrete expe-
riences that demonstrated the target feature (e.g., a dog acting
“smart” by performing a trick at the circus). For these abstract
features, there would be an advantage for pictures. For some
referents used in the symbolic-comparison task, however, there
would be a high likelihood that the verbal code could directly
provide the abstract feature. As suggested by Paivio and Mar-
schark (1980), these would be referents for which the abstract
feature would have been frequently encoded from linguistic inputs
(statements read or heard, like “chimps are smart” and “worms are
dumb”). A picture-superiority effect would not be expected for
these particular kind of abstract features (cf. Paivio & Marschark,
1980). It is uncertain how one might identify a priori which
abstract features would be encoded as such; however, one possi-
bility is the dimension of feature salience. Marschark (1983)
established that some features are more salient for particular ref-
erents and other features are less salient. Salient features were
those that were viewed (on the basis of normative judgments) as
highly characteristic or highly related to the stimulus referent
(animals), and nonsalient features were viewed as less character-
istic or not strongly related. It might be the case that only salient
abstract features would support responding directly from the pu-
tative verbal code storing that feature. If so, then picture superi-
ority would be evidenced for all but salient abstract features.
To test these predictions, we manipulated the concreteness of
the features being compared. Some comparisons required judg-
ments based on concrete attributes (size or texture) and other
comparisons required judgments based on abstract attributes (fe-
rocity or intelligence). We also manipulated the salience of the
feature being compared. Finally, we manipulated the distance
between the items of a pair on the dimension being considered.
That is, some items were close together in rated magnitude on the
comparator dimension, and some were far apart. A benchmark
finding in the literature is that latencies are slower in near than in
far comparisons (the distance effect; Banks & Flora, 1977; Moyer,
1973; Moyer & Bayer, 1976). We wanted to replicate this standard
distance effect to help establish that our procedures and materials
were not atypical. By doing so, the theoretical currency of an
elimination of the picture-superiority effect (if found) would be
strengthened.
Experiment 1
Method
Materials, Design, and Apparatus
The procedure for developing the item pool is described first. An initial
pool of 89 animal names was compiled using 78 animal names (human was
omitted, and polar bear was replaced with bear) from Holyoak and Mah’s
1 Concrete features can also be stored in the verbal system. For purposes
of quantitative judgments about stored features, the theory assumes that the
nonverbal system will contribute preferentially over “dual” verbal codes.
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(1981) study plus 11 more animal names.2 Four dimensions (two concrete
and two abstract) were chosen for the rating task, with each dimension
represented by two adjectives representing conceptual endpoints of the
dimension. The concrete dimensions were texture (softer or rougher) and
size (smaller or larger); the abstract dimensions were ferocity (meeker or
fiercer; see Kerst & Howard, 1977) and intelligence (dumber or smarter).
Nine four-page booklets, each representing a different rating task, were
constructed with the animal names placed in a different random order in
each booklet. Each of 22 undergraduate students from Purdue University,
West Lafayette, Indiana, participating in partial fulfillment of an introduc-
tory psychology course requirement, completed each of the nine rating-task
booklets. In the first booklet, eight different adjectives (large, small, fierce,
meek, smart, dumb, soft, and rough) were printed at the top of each page.
Following Marschark’s (1983) procedure, we told participants that the
adjectives represented attributes commonly associated with different ani-
mals and that their task was to select which attribute best characterized
each animal and write it on the line next to the animal’s name. Participants
were told that their responses should represent each species in general
rather than a particular member with which the participant may have had
a personal experience (e.g., dog referred to dogs in general and not Lassie
or a family dog).
After completing the salience-rating task, participants completed mag-
nitude ratings on each of the eight dimensional adjectives. Each booklet
represented a different adjective. The adjective to be rated was printed at
the top of each page of its respective booklet along with a 9-point scale,
ranging from 1 (minimum magnitude) to 9 (maximum magnitude). Partic-
ipants were told to write the number corresponding to their rating on the
line next to each animal’s name. The eight booklets were given to each
participant in a different random order, with the stipulation that booklets
representing different ends of the same dimension (e.g., smaller and larger)
were not presented sequentially. Participants completed the rating booklets
at their own pace.
Pair selection. The results of the salience ratings were used to deter-
mine the degree of association of each animal with each of the eight
adjectives. For each animal, the most salient adjective was identified on the
basis of the adjective chosen by the most raters. The least salient adjective
corresponded to the adjective chosen by the fewest (or none) of the raters.
Animals for which the most frequently chosen adjective did not exceed the
least frequently chosen adjective by at least 10 were eliminated from the
item pool. The remaining items were used in this study and are presented
in the Appendix. Using these items and their adjective magnitude ratings,
we developed a final set of 32 animal pairs, 4 pairs for each of the eight
comparative adjectives. For each adjective, 2 of the pairs represented
animals for which the adjective was salient, and 2 pairs represented animals
for which the adjective was nonsalient. In addition, for both the salient and
nonsalient pairs, 1 pair represented animals with magnitude ratings on the
attribute that were far apart from each other (mean difference 3.44) and 1
pair represented animals with magnitude ratings on the attribute that were
close together (mean difference  1.33), F(1, 16)  41.95, p  .0001,
MSE 0.8521. It is important to note that this difference in distance for far
and near pairs did not vary among the various levels of the factors of
concreteness, salience, or dimension (all ps  .25), allaying any concerns
about differential distance scaling within near- and far-trial conditions of
this experiment. Lastly, the far pairs (e.g., chicken–dog) were used twice
for each dimension (e.g., intelligence): once for the adjective representing
the low end of the dimension (e.g., dumber) and once for the adjective
representing the high end (smarter). In this way, concrete and abstract
dimensions were each represented by three unique pairs.
List construction. The 32 pairs were used to construct two 16-pair lists.
Although the far pairs were repeated to represent both the ends of a
dimension, each list presented each pair only once. Each list therefore
represented a 2 (concrete vs. abstract)  2 (salient vs. nonsalient)  2 (far
vs. near) 2 (concrete dimensions: texture or size vs. abstract dimensions:
ferocity or intelligence) factorial design. Specific dimension adjectives
(e.g., for texture: rougher or softer) were nested in a balanced manner
across the pairs of each list; these lists are given in the Appendix.3 Two
versions of each list were constructed. The versions contained the same
items but with the left–right positions of the items reversed, resulting in
four lists. Two versions of each of the four test lists were constructed, one
containing the names of each animal, the other containing pictures. All
stimuli were placed on 10  15 cm cards. The pictures were artist-drawn
black-ink line drawings—some of which were patterned after those given
in Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980)—that were produced according to the
featural constraints specified by design characteristics of this experiment.
Specifically, featural diagnosticity (see Snodgrass & McCullough, 1986),
concerning size and texture characteristics of the animals, was minimized
in their depictions. To control for possible size effects in processing the
picture and stimuli (see Theios & Amrhein, 1989b), we presented the
words in 24-point Executive font in capitals. Figure 1 presents sample
picture and word stimuli. All items in Experiment 1 were presented
tachistoscopically, resulting in subtended horizontal visual angles for in-
dividual pictures to average 2.16° (range  .82°–3.61°) and for individual
words to average 2.08° (range .89°–4.29°; F 1).4 Both the picture and
the word pairs were placed on the cards so the outer edges of the items
were 11-cm apart, such that all picture–word-item pair stimuli subtended a
visual angle of 7.46°. All stimuli were presented on a 3-channel mirror
tachistoscope (Gerbrands Model No. T-38–1; Arlington, MA), and re-
sponse times recorded on an automatic digital timer (Lafayette Instruments
Model No. 54035; Lafayette, IN).
Participants
Participants in the symbolic-comparison task were 48 undergraduates
who voluntarily participated as part of an undergraduate psychology course
requirement at Purdue University. None of the participants in the compar-
ison task had taken part in the norming task.
Procedure
Half of the participants received the picture condition, and the other half
received the word condition. Within each stimulus-modality condition, 6
participants were randomly assigned to a given left–right order of one of
2 We chose animals as our semantic category because calibration of their
concrete and abstract attributes is readily available in the symbolic-comparison
literature (Cˇ ech & Shoben, 2001; Holyoak & Mah, 1981; Marschark, 1983;
Paivio & Marschark, 1980; Shoben & Wilson, 1998). Moreover, concrete–
abstract attribute calibration is not readily available (or even possible) for
other categories such as furniture, tools, food, and so forth.
3 Lists for the remaining experiments are available from Paul C. Am-
rhein upon request.
4 Equating picture and word stimuli on overall horizontal visual angle
necessitated for many concepts that the height of the picture stimuli be
greater than the word stimuli (see Figure 1), to preserve the natural shape
and proportion of their depictions of real-world animals (see also Seifert,
1997, concerning related issues of trade-offs between stimulus size char-
acteristics and stimulus perceptibility). This resulted in an overall differ-
ence in vertical visual angle between pictures (M 1.72°; range  .41°–
2.73°) and words (.48° for all words). This also resulted in an overall
difference in area between pictures (M  2.89 cm2; range  1.06–4.94
cm2) and words (M  2.13 cm2; range  .91–4.41 cm2). (Exact stimulus
areas were determined for each stimulus using a tracing algorithm imple-
mented on a digitizer tablet.) However, there was considerable overlap in
the distribution of the areas of the picture and word stimuli and, more
important, the difference in mean areas did not result in any reliable picture
advantage in our experiments—indicating that perceptibility of our picture
and word stimuli was functionally equivalent.
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the two concept lists. The animal pairs were presented in a different
random order for each participant. Participants were instructed that they
would be seeing pairs of animals and would choose which member of each
pair was the correct answer to a question the experimenter would ask about
general characteristics of the real-life animals. The experimenter explained
the procedure for responding and then told each participant what the
possible questions would be and also explained that the questions “Which
is softer?” and “Which is rougher” corresponded to questions about the
texture of the animal. For each pair, the experimenter first asked the
comparative question using the carrier phrase “Which is” followed by the
comparative form of the adjective. Approximately 1 s after the end of the
spoken question, a fixation cross appeared. The cross remained visible
for 0.5 s and was immediately followed by a stimulus pair that remained
visible until the participant indicated a response. Participants responded by
using their right or left index finger to press a button corresponding to
whether the correct animal was on the right or left side. As soon as the
participant pressed a button, the stimulus pair disappeared and was re-
placed by a blank screen. The experimenter recorded the response time and
the response before presenting the next comparative. Between responses,
participants kept their index fingers on the response buttons to facilitate
accurate, rapid responding. Although participants were not told that there
would be practice items, the first 8 pairs in each list (one item for each
Figure 1. Sample picture and word stimuli used in Experiment 1. A: Concrete salient–near texture comparison;
B: Concrete salient–far size comparison; C: Concrete nonsalient–far texture comparison; D: Concrete
nonsalient–near size comparison; E: Abstract salient–far ferocity comparison; F: Abstract salient–near intelli-
gence comparison; G: Abstract nonsalient–near ferocity comparison; H: Abstract nonsalient–far intelligence
comparison. Stimuli are not presented to scale.
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comparative) were practice items and were followed immediately by the
16-pair test list. Prior to the practice trials, the stimulus pictures were
shown singly to ensure that each participant was familiar with the appear-
ance and name for each animal. The experimental session lasted approxi-
mately 30 min.
Results
Mixed factor analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted
on the correct judgment latencies and errors, with stimulus-pair
modality (picture or word) as the between-participants factor and
concreteness (concrete or abstract), salience (salient or nonsalient),
and intrastimulus pair distance (near or far) as within-participants
factors. Condition means and error rates are given according to
these factors in Table 1. Two analyses of each measure were
conducted. One analysis involved participants (F1) as the random
variable, with measures collapsed over (a) left–right order of
like-stimulus pair items, (b) the two concept lists, (c) dimension
(texture, size, ferocity, and intelligence),5 and (d) intradimensional
valence (as probed by the adjectives in the questions: rougher or
softer, larger or smaller, fiercer or meeker, smarter or dumber,
respectively). A second analysis involved stimulus concept pairs
(F2) as the random variable, with latencies collapsed over (a)
participants, (b) left–right order of like-stimulus pair items, (c)
dimension, and (d) intradimensional valence. The .05 level of
statistical significance was used in reporting these analyses and
those of the remaining experiments.
Comparison Latencies
Overall, picture (1,402 ms) and word (1,393 ms) stimuli pro-
vided statistically equivalent response speeds (F1  1; F2  1).
Also, there were no significant interactions involving modality (all
Fs  1). Further, to test for the picture-superiority effects antici-
pated by dual-coding views, we conducted planned comparisons.
Contrary to these views, stimulus modality did not vary reliably for
concrete salient comparisons (pictures: 1,254 ms; words: 1,260
ms; F1  1; F2  1), for concrete nonsalient comparisons (pic-
tures: 1,458 ms; words: 1,481 ms), F1  1; F2(1, 4)  1.43, p 
.29, MSE  56,184.80; abstract salient comparisons (pictures:
1,453 ms; words; 1,415 ms), F1  1; F2(1, 4)  2.85, p  .16,
MSE  37,303.00; or for abstract nonsalient comparisons (pic-
tures: 1,444 ms; words: 1,419 ms; F1  1; F2  1).
In contrast, all of the other independent variables significantly
affected response speed. Comparison judgments for concrete di-
mensions (1,363 ms) were faster than for abstract dimensions
(1,433 ms), F1(1, 44)  10.66, MSE  87,075.07; F2(1, 16)  6.33,
MSE  131,302.23. Comparison judgments of salient dimensions
(1,345 ms) were faster than those concerning nonsalient dimensions
(1,450 ms), F1(1, 44) 30.81, MSE69,102.21; F2(1, 16) 17.91,
MSE 131,302.23. Lastly, comparison judgments involving stimulus
pairs near in dimensional distance (1,506 ms) were slower than
those far in dimensional distance (1,289 ms), F1(1, 44)  61.69,
MSE  146,486.78; F2(1, 16)  66.24, MSE  131,302.23.
These effects were qualified by three interactions that converge
on the finding that attribute salience affects the latency pattern for
concrete but not abstract patterns. The Concreteness  Salience
interaction, F1(1, 44)  19.28, MSE  114,537.97; F2(1,
16)  17.43, MSE  131,302.23, was such that salient concrete
judgments (1,257 ms) were faster than salient abstract judgments
(1,433 ms), F1(1, 44)  33.68, MSE  89,080.60; F2(1,
4)  20.61, MSE  142,618.97, but that nonsalient concrete and
abstract judgments (1,469 ms vs. 1,432 ms, respectively) were
equivalent, F1(1, 44)  1.21, p  .27, MSE  112,532.42; F2(1,
4)  1.32, p  .31, MSE  137,183.00. The Salience  Distance
interaction, F1(1, 44)  18.66, MSE  84,721.29; F2(1,
16)  14.67, MSE  131,302.23, showed that near comparisons
were much faster for salient (1,408 ms) than nonsalient (1,604 ms)
judgments, but far comparisons were equivalent for salient (1,282
ms) and nonsalient (1,297 ms) judgments. This pattern of latencies
indicates a substantially smaller distance effect for salient (126 ms)
than for nonsalient (307 ms) judgments.
Finally, there was a Concreteness  Salience  Distance inter-
action, F1(1, 44) 6.31, MSE 87,831.33; F2(1, 16) 3.72, p
.07, MSE  131,302.23. As can be seen in Table 1, for concrete
dimensions, near comparisons were much faster for salient (1,293
ms) than nonsalient (1,650 ms) judgments, but far comparisons
were only somewhat faster for salient (1,221 ms) than nonsalient
(1,289 ms) judgments—resulting in a substantially smaller dis-
tance effect for salient (72 ms) than for nonsalient (361 ms)
5 Preliminary analysis revealed reliable latency differences among the
four dimensions: texture (1,411 ms), size (1,315 ms), ferocity (1,441 ms)
and intelligence (1,424 ms), F1(3, 132)  7.80, MSE  78,704.57; F2(3,
16)  4.62, MSE  131,302.23. However, these differences did not vary
reliably with the levels of the variables included in the main analysis. A
similar pattern was observed among the error rates, although the differ-
ences among the dimensions (texture: 7.29%; size: 5.73%; ferocity: 5.73%;
intelligence: 5.21%) were not statistically significant (all ps  .05). Fi-
nally, there was no evidence of a speed–accuracy tradeoff in these data; the
correlation of comparison latencies and error rates was positive (r  .68).
Table 1
Condition Means (in ms) and Error Rates for Experiment 1
Distance and
stimulus modality
Salient Nonsalient Mean
M
Error
rate M
Error
rate M
Error
rate
Concrete
Near
Picture 1,294 .021 1,652 .250 1,473 .136
Word 1,292 .083 1,648 .125 1,470 .104
Mean 1,293 .052 1,650 .188 1,472 .120
Far
Picture 1,213 .000 1,264 .000 1,239 .000
Word 1,228 .021 1,313 .021 1,271 .021
Mean 1,221 .011 1,289 .011 1,255 .011
Overall 1,257 .032 1,470 .100 1,364 .066
Abstract
Near
Picture 1,533 .104 1,555 .021 1,544 .063
Word 1,514 .125 1,562 .063 1,538 .094
Mean 1,524 .115 1,559 .042 1,542 .079
Far
Picture 1,372 .042 1,333 .021 1,353 .032
Word 1,315 .042 1,276 .021 1,296 .032
Mean 1,344 .042 1,305 .021 1,325 .032
Overall 1,434 .079 1,432 .032 1,433 .056
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judgments, F1(1, 44)  21.55, MSE  92,961.62; F2(1,
8) 16.83, MSE 129,404.66. However, for abstract dimensions,
near comparisons were similar for salient (1,524 ms) and nonsa-
lient (1,559 ms) judgments, as were far comparisons for salient
(1,343 ms) and nonsalient (1,304 ms) judgments—indicating
equivalent distance effects for salient (181 ms) and nonsalient (255
ms) judgments, F1(1, 44)  1.65, p  .20, MSE  79,591.00;
F2(1, 8)  1.78, p  .21, MSE  133,199.80.
Errors
The results of the error analyses revealed a pattern highly
consistent with the latency analyses. Overall, incorrect judgments
occurred on 5.99% of the experimental trials. Differences were not
found between picture (5.73%) and word (6.25%) stimuli (F1  1;
F2  1), between concrete (6.51%) and abstract (5.47%) dimen-
sions (F1 1; F2 1), nor between salient (5.47%) and nonsalient
(6.51%) dimensions (F1 1; F2 1). However, near comparisons
(9.90%) incurred more errors than did far comparisons (2.08%),
F1(1, 44)  22.30, MSE  0.0526; F2(1, 16)  18.00,
MSE  0.0651. There also were two interactions. A Concrete-
ness  Salience interaction, F1(1, 44)  16.04, MSE  0.0393;
F2(1, 16)  9.68, MSE  0.06510, showed that for concrete
dimensions, fewer errors occurred for salient (3.31%) than for
nonsalient judgments (9.90%); however, for abstract dimensions,
more errors occurred for salient judgments (7.81%) than for non-
salient dimensions (3.13%). Also, there was a Concreteness 
Salience Distance interaction, F1(1, 44) 6.60, MSE 0.0639;
F2(1, 16)  6.48, MSE  0.0651. As can be seen in Table 1, for
concrete dimensions, near comparisons exhibited fewer errors for
salient (5.21%) than nonsalient (18.75%) judgments, but far com-
parisons exhibited identical errors for salient (1.04%) and nonsa-
lient (1.04%) judgments—indicating a substantially smaller dis-
tance effect for salient (4.67%) than for nonsalient (17.71%)
judgments, F1(1, 44)  7.53, MSE  0.0584; F2(1, 8)  6.76,
MSE  0.0651. However, for abstract dimensions, near compar-
isons were somewhat similar in errors for salient (11.46%) and
nonsalient (4.17%) judgments, as were far comparisons, for salient
(4.17%) and nonsalient (2.08%) judgments—indicating statisti-
cally nonsignificant differences in the distance effects for salient
(7.29%) and nonsalient (2.08%) judgments, F1(1, 44)  1.05, p 
.31, MSE  0.0618; F2(1, 8)  1.00, p  .34, MSE  0.0651. All
remaining interactions from these analyses were nonsignificant.
Discussion
The results are inconsistent with theoretical assumptions regard-
ing the privileged role of pictures relative to words that are
embraced in prominent views of how knowledge is represented
and accessed. One assumption incorporated into some views is that
pictures have more direct access to conceptual information than do
words (e.g., Banks & Flora, 1977; Nelson et al., 1977; Potter &
Faulconer, 1975). In opposition to this assumption, we found that
pictures produced nominally slower responding than did words.
Theios and Amrhein (1989b) demonstrated that uncontrolled per-
ceptual dimensions like visual angle can produce picture-
superiority effects and suggested that past findings implicating
picture superiority for semantic access could have been compro-
mised by such artifacts. In the present experiment we controlled
for visual angle across pictures and words, and under these con-
ditions we did not find general picture-superiority effects. It is also
noteworthy that other standard effects like the symbolic-distance
effect (Banks & Flora, 1977; Moyer, 1973; Moyer & Bayer, 1976)
and the attribute-salience effect (Marschark, 1983) were obtained.
Dual-coding theory (Paivio, 1986) anticipated a more complex
pattern, such that pictures should be faster than words only for
concrete features. This pattern is based on the dual-coding idea that
pictures having privileged access to an imagery system wherein
concrete features are presumed to be stored. Yet, words and
pictures produced statistically equivalent responding for concrete
features as well as for abstract features. This latter finding is
buttressed by Paivio and Marschark’s (1980, Experiment 1) report
of equivalent responding across pictures and words for intelligence
comparisons.
A more complex variant of the dual-coding approach is also not
supported by the present findings. We thought it possible that the
imagery system might be involved in reflecting on nonsalient
abstract characteristics of a particular animal (the images would be
constructed to assess the target animals’ behaviors for evidence of
the requisite abstract characteristic; Paivio & Marschark, 1980) but
that salient abstract characteristics would have been previously
extracted from experience with the target animals and therefore
would be directly stored in the verbal system (e.g., “chimps are
smart”). However, the three-way interaction between feature con-
creteness, stimulus modality, and salience was not close to signif-
icance. Nor did the planned comparisons support the predicted
pattern. That is, it was not the case that pictures produced statis-
tically faster responding than did words for nonsalient abstract
features.
Several less important findings emerged from this experiment.
Concrete features generally supported faster responding than did
abstract features, but this effect was limited to salient features. For
nonsalient features, concrete features did not produce significantly
faster comparisons than did abstract features. Marschark (1983, p.
197) also reported a significant Salience  Concreteness interac-
tion (using the dimensions of size and ferocity only and using
words only) in which the advantage of size (concrete) relative to
ferocity (abstract) comparisons was greater for salient than for
nonsalient pairs. The Salience  Concreteness interaction must be
viewed with caution, however, because there is uncertainty in both
studies about whether the salience values are equivalent across
concrete and abstract features.
A related issue concerns the three-way Distance  Salience 
Feature Concreteness interaction. This interaction reflected the fact
that salient concrete features especially facilitated response speed
relative to other features for near comparisons. Stated another way,
as indicated in Table 1, the standard distance effect was substan-
tially reduced for salient concrete features. We know of no pub-
lished report in the symbolic-comparison literature in which such
an attenuation in the distance effect because of attribute salience
has been observed. It is possible that this effect also reflects
artifacts, however. We address this concern in Experiment 3B and
accordingly delay discussion of this issue until then. More impor-
tant, we first present three additional experiments to establish the
stability of our finding that when visual angle is equated, there is
no picture-superiority effect. Previous reports of stimulus-modality
effects have found variable patterns depending on whether stimu-
lus modality is manipulated between- or within-participants (e.g.,
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see Paivio & Marschark, 1980). Relatedly, the null stimulus-
modality finding of Experiment 1 could reflect an insensitivity in
the between-participants manipulation of modality or be otherwise
spurious—the power to reject the null hypothesis of no modality
difference with an obtained picture–word difference of 75 ms (e.g.,
the approximate obtained-difference mean reported by Seifert,
1997) averages to be only .25 for participants-analysis compari-
sons (although .74 for concepts-analysis comparisons; see Keppel,
1973). Therefore, before further considering the theoretical impli-
cations of the findings of Experiment 1, we present three related,
additional experiments that test for modality effects in the
symbolic-comparison task.
Experiment 2
The main changes from Experiment 1 were that stimulus mo-
dality was manipulated within-participant, and distance was not
included as a variable. The focus was again on the effects of
stimulus modality. By increasing the number of participants in the
within-participant manipulation of stimulus modality, we at-
tempted to increase the power to detect stimulus-modality effects,
if present. An absence of a modality main effect would discredit
the idea that pictures give privileged access to semantic memory.
If there were also no Stimulus Modality  Concreteness interac-
tion nor a three-way interaction with salience, then more restrictive
approaches (e.g., dual coding) would be discredited as well.
Method
Materials and Design
Two master 16-pair lists were constructed using the same item pairs as
in Experiment 1. Each list consisted of 16 pairs reflecting a 2 (concrete or
abstract)  2 (salient or nonsalient)  2 (concrete dimensions: texture or
size vs. abstract dimensions: ferocity or intelligence) 2 (intradimensional
valence; e.g., texture: rougher vs. softer) factorial design. Pairs were
selected to balance distance differences explicitly measured in Experi-
ment 1, resulting in a mean distance value of 2.25 (the mean distance value
for Experiment 1 was 2.39). It is important to note that the mean distance
value for this experiment did not vary reliably among the levels of the
concreteness or salience factors or between dimensions within the con-
creteness levels (all ps  .31), which allays concerns of differences in
average distance values confounding the interpretation of the main effects
and interactions in the latency and error analyses. Across the two master
lists, some items appeared twice; however each appearance was nonredun-
dantly distributed across the levels of the concreteness, salience, dimen-
sion, and dimension valence. Four final-item lists were created by revers-
ing the order of the item-pair members of the two master lists. In a
counterbalanced fashion, each participant received one master item list
appearing (in either normal or reversed order) as picture stimuli and the
other appearing (in either normal or reversed order) as word stimuli. Two
practice lists of eight animal pairs were devised from animal names not
used in the experimental stimuli. Half appeared as picture pairs and the
other half as word pairs and represented examples of the levels of con-
creteness, salience factors, and dimensions.
Participants
Participants were 32 undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology
courses at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Apparatus and Procedure
Apparatus and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1, with the
exception that participants received both picture and word stimuli (from
different lists). Randomly determined, half of the participants received the
picture stimuli first and the other half received the word stimuli first.
Like-modality practice stimuli were presented prior to the presentation of
the experiment stimuli for each participant. The experimental session lasted
approximately 45 min.
Results
ANOVAs were conducted on correct judgment latencies and
errors, with stimulus-pair modality (picture or word) and concep-
tual characteristics of concreteness (concrete or abstract) and sa-
lience (salient or nonsalient) as fixed factors. Condition means and
error rates are given according to these factors in Table 2. Two
analyses of each measure were conducted. One involved partici-
pants (F1) as the random variable, with measures collapsed over
(a) left–right order of like-stimulus pair items, (b) the two item
lists, (c) dimension (texture, size, ferocity, or intelligence),6 and (d)
intradimensional valence (rougher or softer, larger or smaller,
fiercer or meeker, smarter or dumber, respectively). A second
analysis involved stimulus item-pairs (F2) as the random variable,
with latencies collapsed over (a) participants, (b) left–right order of
like-stimulus pair items, (c) dimension, and (d) intradimensional
valence.
Comparison Latencies
Replicating Experiment 1, picture (1,255 ms) and word (1,249
ms) stimuli were responded to similarly (F1 1; F2 1), and there
were no significant interactions involving stimulus modality (all
ps  .26). As in Experiment 1, planned comparisons were con-
ducted to test for the picture-superiority effects anticipated by
dual-coding views. Again, contrary to these views, stimulus mo-
dality did not vary reliably for concrete salient comparisons (pic-
tures: 1,073 ms; words: 1,131 ms), F1(1,30)  1.72, p  .19,
MSE 123,222.00; F2(1, 7) 1.13, p .32, MSE 188,575.00);
for concrete nonsalient comparisons (pictures: 1,261 ms; words:
1,253 ms; F1  1; F2  1), for abstract salient comparisons
(pictures: 1,349 ms; words: 1,318 ms; F1  1; F2  1), or for
abstract nonsalient comparisons (pictures: 1,337 ms; words: 1,294
ms; F1  1; F2  1). Indeed, although statistically nonsignificant,
the differences between pictures and words for concrete nonsalient
and abstract nonsalient comparisons are in the opposite direction
of that predicted from one dual-coding account (Paivio, 1978).
6 Preliminary analysis revealed reliable latency differences among the
four dimensions: texture (1,298 ms), size (1,138 ms), ferocity (1,307 ms),
and intelligence (1,266 ms), F1(3, 90)  11.04, MSE  142,097.22; F2(3,
24)  6.34, MSE  247,467.69. Significant error-rate differences were
also observed among the dimensions (texture: 16.40%; size: 8.20%; feroc-
ity: 12.11%; intelligence: 8.20%) in the participants analysis, F1(3,
90)  3.97, MSE  0.0986; but not in the concepts analysis, F2(3,
24)  1.70, p  .19, MSE  0.2308. These differences did not vary
reliably with the levels of the variables included in the main analyses (all
ps  .05). Finally, there was no evidence of a speed–accuracy tradeoff in
these data; indeed, the correlation of comparison latencies and error rates
was highly positive (r  .78).
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The other variables did significantly influence response speed.
Comparison judgments of salient dimensions (1,180 ms) were
faster than those concerning nonsalient dimensions (1,324 ms),
F1(1, 30)  33.46, MSE 160,344.34; F2(1, 28)  14.78, MSE 
362,899.50. Comparison judgments involving concrete dimen-
sions (1,218 ms) were faster than those concerning abstract dimen-
sions (1,286 ms), F1(1, 30)  7.55, MSE  159,597.56; F2(1,
28)  3.32, p  .08, MSE  362,899.50. This concreteness effect
was qualified by a Concreteness  Salience interaction, F1(1, 30) 
15.06, MSE  126,486.81; F2(1, 28)  5.25, MSE  362,899.50.
Whereas salient concrete judgments (1,102 ms) were much faster
than salient abstract judgments (1,257 ms), F1(1, 30)  20.14,
MSE  152,492.00; F2(1, 14)  6.98, MSE  439,925.00, non-
salient concrete judgments (1,333 ms) and nonsalient abstract
judgments (1,316 ms) were equivalent (F1  1; F2  1).
Errors
Errors occurred on 11.23% of the experimental trials. Signifi-
cant differences were not found between picture (11.91%) and
word (10.55%) stimuli (F1 and F2  1). Also, concrete (12.31%)
and abstract (10.16%) comparisons incurred equivalent errors (F1
and F2  1). However, salient judgments (7.23%) incurred fewer
errors than did nonsalient judgments (15.23%), F1(1, 30)  15.69,
MSE  0.1064; F2(1, 28)  6.24, MSE  0.2633. There was a
Salience  Concreteness interaction that was significant over
participants, F1(1, 30)  6.44, MSE  0.0947; but not over
concepts, F2(1, 28)  2.32, p  .14, MSE  0.2633. For concrete
comparisons, far fewer errors were exhibited for salient (5.86%)
than nonsalient (18.75%) judgments, but for abstract comparisons,
approximately the same proportion of errors occurred for salient
(8.59%) than nonsalient (11.72%) judgments. Remaining interac-
tions were nonsignificant.
Discussion
The patterns were completely in line with those of Experi-
ment 1. There was neither an effect of stimulus modality nor an
interaction between stimulus modality and concreteness nor an
interaction between stimulus modality, concreteness, and salience.
These effects did not emerge even though this experiment in-
creased the statistical sensitivity for revealing such an effect if
present (by using a within-participants design). Thus, once again
there is no statistical support for the idea that pictures afford
privileged access to semantic memory nor is there support for
more restricted effects of pictures as anticipated by dual-coding
theory. Attribute concreteness and salience again facilitated re-
sponse speeds equally for the two stimulus modalities.
Experiments 3A and 3B
All existing views that anticipate picture-superiority effects
agree that such effects should be observed at least for concrete
features. To provide an even more methodologically sensitive test
for these possible effects than may have been allowed in Experi-
ments 1 and 2, we designed the comparisons in Experiments 3A
and 3B to involve only concrete attribute dimensions (with stim-
ulus modality again manipulated within-participants). It is impor-
tant to note that this allowed each participant to receive twice as
many picture and word trials for concrete features as were pre-
sented in Experiment 2. Power indices for the modality effects of
the concrete salient and nonsalient trials in Experiment 2 yielded
only moderate values: To reject the null hypothesis of no modality
difference with an obtained picture–word difference of 75 ms,
respective power values were .65 and .30 for participants-analysis
comparisons, and respective power values were .43 and .50 for
concepts-analysis comparisons. Specifically, though statistically
nonsignificant, the concrete salient comparison latencies in Exper-
iment 2 (see Table 2) suggest that there may be a picture advantage
for concrete salient comparisons. We hypothesized that if this is an
actual effect, then additional stimulus items for that condition in
the present experiment should increase the power of the modality
comparison for that condition and reveal a reliable difference.
Contrariwise, if such a picture advantage for this condition does
not exist, then the reduction in variance afforded a larger stimulus
trial set should result in smaller disparities between picture and
word latencies and provide further statistical evidence against the
picture-superiority effect. In addition to the issue of limited power,
requiring participants to respond to abstract items in Experiments 1
and 2 may have encouraged a strategy that masked picture-
superiority effects. We reasoned that if there were an advantage for
pictures, it could be fully exploited when participants only had to
make concrete judgments. Finally, distance was included as a
variable to investigate the reliability of the moderating effects of
salience for distance effects with concrete features found in
Experiment 1.
Experiment 3A
Method
Materials and Design
Pair selection. The same set of animals used in Experiments 1 and 2
was used, with the concepts “kangaroo,” “bee,” “frog,” “worm,” “fly,” and
“eagle” replaced by “hippo,” “buffalo,” “turkey,” “zebra,” and “armadillo.”
This change negligibly affected the average horizontal visual angles of the
picture and word stimuli; for this set of animal concepts, pictures sub-
tended 2.18° (range  .82°–3.61°) and words subtended 2.14° (range 
Table 2
Condition Means (in ms) and Error Rates for Experiment 2
Stimulus
modality
Salient Nonsalient Mean
M
Error
rate M
Error
rate M
Error
rate
Concrete
Picture 1,073 .047 1,349 .219 1,211 .133
Word 1,131 .070 1,318 .156 1,225 .113
M 1,102 .059 1,333 .188 1,218 .123
Abstract
Picture 1,261 .086 1,337 .125 1,299 .106
Word 1,253 .086 1,294 .109 1,274 .098
M 1,257 .086 1,316 .117 1,287 .102
Overall 1,180 .073 1,325 .153
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.89°–4.29°; F  1).7 Like Experiment 1, a set of 32 animal pairs was
developed, 4 pairs for each of the four concrete comparative adjectives
(smaller and larger for size; smoother and rougher for texture). For each
adjective, two of the pairs represented animals for which the adjective was
salient and two pairs represented animals for which the adjective was
nonsalient. In addition, for both the salient and nonsalient pairs, one pair
represented animals whose magnitude ratings on the attribute were far from
each other (mean difference  3.63) and one pair represented animals
whose magnitude ratings on the attribute were near each other (mean
difference  1.08), F(1, 24)  80.49, p  .0001, MSE  0.6447. It is
important to note that these average distance values for far and near stimuli
did not vary reliably among the levels of the salience factor or dimension
(all ps  .16), which allays concerns about differential distance scaling
within near and far trial conditions of this experiment.
List construction. The 32 pairs were used to construct two 16-pair lists.
Each list presented each pair only once. Across the two lists, some items
appeared twice; however each appearance was nonredundantly distributed
across the levels of the concreteness, distance, and dimension. Each list
therefore represented a 2 (salient vs. nonsalient)  2 (far vs. near)  2
(texture vs. size)  2 (intradimensional valence; e.g., texture: rougher vs.
softer) factorial design. Two versions of each list were constructed. The
versions contained the same items but with the left–right positions of the
items reversed, resulting in four test lists. Two versions of each of the four
lists were constructed, one containing the names of each animal, the other
containing line drawings. Two practice lists of eight animal pairs each were
devised from animal names not used in the experimental stimuli. One list
appeared as picture pairs and the other list as word pairs; both lists
represented examples of the levels of salience, distance, and dimension factors.
Participants
Participants were 32 undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology
courses at the University of New Mexico. None had participated in
Experiment 2.
Apparatus and Procedure
The apparatus was identical to that used in Experiments 1 and 2. Each
participant received two stimulus lists, one appearing as pictures, and the
other appearing as words. Eight participants were randomly assigned in a
counterbalanced manner to a given left–right order of the two concept lists.
Within each list, animal pairs were presented in a different random order
for each participant; the order of picture- and word-stimulus lists was
counterbalanced across participants. Prior to each list, participants received
a set of eight practice stimuli, appearing in the modality of the immediately
following experimental stimuli; animal pairs represented were different
from those used in the experimental trials. Remaining aspects of the
procedure were the same as those in Experiments 1 and 2. The experimen-
tal session lasted approximately 45 min.
Results
ANOVAs were conducted on the correct judgment latencies and
errors, with (a) conceptual characteristics of salience (salient or
nonsalient), (b) intrastimulus pair distance (near or far), and (c)
stimulus-pair modality (picture or word) as fixed, within-
participants factors. Condition means and error rates are given
according to these factors in Table 3. Two analyses of each
measure were conducted. One involved participants (F1) as the
random variable, with measures collapsed over (a) left–right order
of like-stimulus pair items, (b) the two item lists, (c) dimension
(texture, size)8, and (d) intradimensional valence (rougher or
softer, larger or smaller, respectively). A second analysis involved
stimulus-concept pairs (F2) as the random variable, with latencies
collapsing over (a) participants, (b) left–right order of like-
stimulus pair items, (c) dimension, and (d) intradimensional
valence.
Comparison Latencies
Overall, picture (1,232 ms) and word (1,232 ms) stimuli pro-
duced identical response speeds (F1  1; F2  1). Further,
stimulus modality did not significantly interact with any other
variable (all ps  .14). As in the previous experiments, planned
comparisons were conducted to test for the picture-superiority
effects anticipated by dual-coding theory. Again, contrary to that
view, stimulus modality did not vary reliably for concrete salient
comparisons (pictures: 1,133 ms; words: 1,162 ms; F1  1; F2 
1) nor for concrete nonsalient comparisons (pictures: 1,330 ms;
words: 1,302 ms; F1  1; F2  1).
In contrast, the other variables significantly affected response
speed. Comparison judgments for salient dimensions (1,148 ms)
were faster than those for nonsalient dimensions (1,316 ms), F1(1,
30)  49.62, MSE 146,848.44; F2(1, 28)  44.65, MSE 
163,184.96. Comparison judgments for stimulus pairs near in
dimensional distance (1,304 ms) were slower than those far in
dimensional distance (1,160 ms), F1(1, 30)  41.93, MSE 
128,137.08; F2(1, 28)  32.93, MSE  163,184.96. These effects
were qualified by a Salience  Distance interaction, F1(1,
30)  14.21, MSE  87,535.33; F2(1, 28)  7.62, MSE 
163,184.96, such that near comparisons were much faster for
salient (1,185 ms) than nonsalient (1,424 ms) judgments, but far
comparisons were only somewhat faster for salient (1,110 ms) than
nonsalient (1,209 ms) judgments. As was found in Experiment 1
for concrete dimensions, this pattern of latencies indicates a sub-
stantially smaller distance effect for salient (75 ms) than for
nonsalient (215 ms) judgments (see Table 3). All other interactions
were nonsignificant in this analysis.
Errors
Errors occurred on 9.18% of the experimental trials. There was
no difference in errors found between picture (9.18%) and word
(9.18%) stimuli (F1  1; F2  1). However, salient judgments
7 For the same reasons stated for Experiment 1, there was an overall
difference in vertical visual angle between pictures (M  1.75°; range 
.82°–2.73°) and words (.48° for all words). There was also an overall area
difference between pictures (M  3.08 cm2; range  1.06–4.94 cm2) and
words (mean2.20 cm2; range  .91–4.41 cm2). Again, there was con-
siderable overlap in the distribution of the areas of the picture and word
stimuli and, more important, the difference in mean areas did not result in
any reliable picture advantage in our experiments—indicating that the
perceptibility of our picture and word stimuli was functionally equivalent
in Experiment 3A.
8 Preliminary analysis did not reveal reliable latency differences between
the two dimensions: texture (1,249 ms) and size (1,215 ms; both ps .05).
Moreover, this small difference did not vary reliably with the levels of the
variables included in the main analysis. A similar pattern was observed
among the error rates, with the difference in the dimensions (texture:
10.35%; size: 8.01%) being statistically nonsignificant ( ps  .05). Lastly,
comparison latencies and error rates were positively correlated, indicating
no speed–accuracy tradeoff in the data (r  .75).
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(6.25%) incurred fewer errors than did nonsalient judgments
(12.11%), F1(1, 30)  13.89, MSE  0.0633; F2(1, 28)  6.83,
MSE  0.1286. Near comparisons (14.65%) incurred more errors
than did far comparisons (3.71%), F1(1, 30)  29.40,
MSE 0.1042; F2(1, 28) 23.81, MSE 0.1286. Also, there was
a Salience  Distance interaction, F1(1, 30)  6.36,
MSE  0.0615; F2(1, 28)  3.04, p  .10, MSE  0.1286. As can
be seen in Table 3, for near comparisons, fewer errors were
exhibited for salient (9.77%) than nonsalient (19.53%) judgments,
but for far comparisons, only slightly fewer errors were exhibited
for salient (2.73%) than nonsalient (4.69%) judgments—indicating
a smaller distance effect for salient (7.03%) than for nonsalient
(14.84%) judgments. All remaining interactions were nonsignificant.
Discussion
In this experiment, a picture-superiority effect was again not
evident. This pattern was found in both the latency and error
analyses, and it provides clear, within-participant support for a
claim of modality-independent processing of conceptual attributes
in symbolic comparisons when nominal control over physical
stimulus characteristics of pictures and words is exercised. It is
important to note that this independence was revealed under con-
ditions of adequate statistical power for the comparisons involving
stimulus modality. To reject the null hypothesis of no modality
difference with an obtained picture–word difference of 75 ms,
power values for concrete salient comparisons were .87 for the
participants analysis and .80 for the concepts analysis; correspond-
ing values for concrete nonsalient comparisons were .70 for the
participants analysis and .80 for the concepts analysis. Also, the
reduction in the distance effect afforded concrete salient attribute
comparisons that was found in Experiment 1 was replicated.
Experiment 3B
The purpose of Experiment 3B was to replicate the findings of
Experiment 3A using salient and nonsalient pairs that were
matched on dimensional magnitude. Specifically, the locus of the
Salience Distance interaction observed in Experiments 1 and 3A
may be due to a confound in the stimulus materials. Inadvertently,
stimulus construction in Experiments 1 and 3A resulted in salient
near pairs having higher overall dimension magnitudes than non-
salient near pairs but with salient far and nonsalient far having
equivalent values.9 In Experiment 1, salient near and salient far
pairs had average dimension magnitudes of 6.72 and 4.44, respec-
tively, whereas nonsalient near and nonsalient far pairs had aver-
age values of 4.61 and 4.77, respectively. Likewise, in Experiment
3A, salient near and salient far pairs had average dimension
magnitudes of 6.82 and 3.75, respectively, whereas nonsalient
near and nonsalient far pairs had average values of 4.11 and 4.58,
respectively.10 This asymmetry may have promoted the Sa-
lience  Distance interaction because of a differential serial po-
sition effect in the symbolic comparisons (Cˇ ech & Shoben, 2001;
Moyer & Dumais, 1978; Shoben & Wilson, 1998). This effect is
such that comparisons involving concepts both high (or low) in
magnitude on a given dimension are facilitated relative to those
that are both intermediate on that dimension. Accordingly, relative
to salient far and nonsalient far comparisons, salient near com-
parisons should be faster than nonsalient near comparisons. Rep-
lication of the Salience  Distance interaction with dimension
magnitude controlled would indicate that it is not a methodological
artifact, but it is indeed evidence of a basic distinction in the process-
ing of salient and nonsalient magnitude information. Moreover, this
experiment allowed a final opportunity, under somewhat different
stimulus pairings, for a picture-superiority effect to reveal itself.
Method
Materials and Design
Pair selection. The same set of animals used in Experiment 3A was
used, with concepts “buffalo,” “turkey,” “gorilla,” “snail,” “leopard,”
“goat,” and “donkey” replaced by “weasel,” “lizard,” “antelope,” “mon-
key,” “bee,” “frog,” “fly,” and “seal.” This change negligibly affected the
average horizontal visual angles of the picture and word stimuli; for this set
of animal concepts, pictures subtended 2.19° (range  .82°–3.61°) and
words subtended 2.07° (range  .89°–4.29°; F  1).11 As in Experiment
3A, a set of 32 animal pairs was constructed, 4 pairs for each of the four
concrete comparative adjectives (smaller and larger for size; smoother and
rougher for texture). For each adjective, 2 of the pairs represented animals
for which the adjective was salient, and two pairs represented animals for
which the adjective was nonsalient. In addition, for both the salient and
nonsalient pairs, 1 pair represented animals whose magnitude ratings on the
attribute were far from each other (mean difference  3.76), and 1 pair
represented animals whose magnitude ratings on the attribute were near
each other (mean difference  1.05), F(1, 24)  433.97, p  .0001,
9 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this astute observation.
10 Although distance was not manipulated in Experiment 2, dimension
magnitudes were equivalent across the salient concrete and abstract pairs
(5.68 and 5.08) and nonsalient concrete and abstract pairs (4.74 and 4.79;
all ps  .26).
11 For the same reasons stated for Experiments 1 and 3A, there was an
overall difference in vertical visual angle between pictures (M  1.73°;
range  .82°–2.73°) and words (.48° for all words). There was also an
overall area difference between pictures (M  2.99 cm2; range  1.06–
4.94 cm2) and words (M  2.14 cm2; range  .91–4.41 cm2). Again, there
was considerable overlap in the distribution of the areas of the picture and
word stimuli and, more important, the difference in mean areas did not
result in any reliable picture advantage in our experiments—indicating that
the perceptibility of our picture and word stimuli was functionally equiv-
alent in Experiment 3B.
Table 3
Condition Means (in ms) and Error Rates for Experiment 3A
Distance and
stimulus modality
Salient Nonsalient Mean
M
Error
rate M
Error
rate M
Error
rate
Concrete
Near
Picture 1,172 .070 1,431 .211 1,302 .141
Word 1,199 .125 1,417 .180 1,308 .153
M 1,186 .098 1,424 .200 1,305 .149
Far
Picture 1,095 .023 1,230 .063 1,163 .043
Word 1,125 .031 1,188 .031 1,157 .031
M 1,110 .027 1,209 .047 1,160 .037
Overall 1,148 .063 1,317 .124
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MSE 0.1356. It is important to note that these average distance values for
far and near stimuli did not vary reliably among the levels of the salience
factor or dimension (all ps  .11), which allays concerns about differential
distance scaling within near and far trial conditions of this experiment.
Finally, pair stimuli were selected to equate overall dimensional magnitude
across salient and nonsalient comparisons. For salient near and nonsalient
near pairs, dimension magnitude averaged 4.18 and 4.36, respectively
(F  1). For salient far and nonsalient far pairs, dimension magnitude
averaged 4.38 and 4.74, respectively (F  1).
List construction. The procedure of list construction was identical to
that in Experimental 3A.
Participants
Participants were 32 undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology
courses at the University of New Mexico. None had participated in Ex-
periments 2 or 3A.
Apparatus and Procedure
The apparatus and procedure were identical to that used in Experiment
3A.
Results
ANOVAs were conducted on the correct judgment latencies and
errors, with conceptual characteristics of (a) salience (salient or
nonsalient), (b) intrastimulus pair distance (near or far), and (c)
stimulus pair modality (picture or word) as fixed, within-
participants factors. Condition means and error rates are given
according to these factors in Table 4. Two analyses of each
measure were conducted. One involved participants (F1) as the
random variable, with measures collapsed over (a) left-right order
of like-stimulus pair items, (b) the two item lists, (c) dimension
(texture or size),12 and (d) intradimensional valence (rougher or
softer, larger or smaller, respectively). A second analysis involved
stimulus concept-pairs (F2) as the random variable, with latencies
collapsed over (a) participants, (b) left-right order of like-stimulus
pair items, (c) dimension, and (d) intradimensional valence.
Comparison Latencies
Overall, picture (1,234 ms) and word (1,241 ms) stimuli pro-
duced equivalent response speeds (F1  1; F2  1). Further,
stimulus modality did not significantly interact with any other
variable (all ps  .10). As in the previous experiments, planned
comparisons were conducted to test for the picture-superiority
effects anticipated by dual-coding theory. Again, contrary to that
view, stimulus modality did not vary reliably for concrete salient
comparisons (pictures: 1,156 ms, words: 1,170 ms; F1  1; F2 
1), nor for concrete nonsalient comparisons (pictures: 1,312 ms,
words: 1,313 ms; F1  1; F2  1).
In contrast, the other variables significantly affected response
speed. Comparison judgments of salient dimensions (1,163 ms)
were faster than those concerning nonsalient dimensions (1,312
ms), F1(1, 30)  29.60, MSE 193,721.50; F2(1, 28)  12.62,
MSE  454,262.37. Comparison judgments involving stimulus
pairs near in dimensional distance (1,359 ms) were slower than
those far in dimensional distance (1,116 ms), F1(1, 30)  47.49,
MSE 319,335.07; F2(1, 28)  33.39, MSE  454,262.37. These
effects were qualified by a Salience  Distance interaction, F1(1,
30)  9.75, MSE  208,269.35; F2(1, 28)  4.47, MSE 
454,262.37, such that near comparisons were much faster for
salient (1,240 ms) than nonsalient (1,479 ms) judgments, but far
comparisons were only somewhat faster for salient (1,086 ms) than
nonsalient (1,146 ms) judgments. As was found in Experiments 1
and 3A, for concrete dimensions, this pattern of latencies indicates
a substantially smaller distance effect for salient (154 ms) than for
nonsalient (333 ms) judgments (see Table 4). All other interactions
were nonsignificant in this analysis.
Errors
Errors occurred on 8.98% of the experimental trials. There was
no difference in errors found between picture (8.20%) and word
(9.77%) stimuli (F1  1; F2  1). However, salient judgments
(5.86%) incurred fewer errors than did nonsalient judgments
(12.11%), F1(1, 30)  9.52, MSE  0.1051; F2(1, 28)  6.68,
MSE  0.1497. Near comparisons (14.26%) incurred more errors
than did far comparisons (3.71%), F1 (1, 30)  38.85, MSE 
0.0733; F2(1, 28)  19.02, MSE  0.1497. As can be seen in
Table 4, there is a pattern of errors consistent with the Salience 
Distance interaction reported for Experiments 1 and 3A (although
this time, both ps  .05). For near comparisons, fewer errors were
exhibited for salient (10.16%) than nonsalient (18.36%) judg-
ments, but for far comparisons, relatively speaking, only margin-
ally fewer errors were exhibited for salient (1.62%) than nonsalient
(5.86%) judgments—indicating a smaller distance effect for salient
(8.59%) than for nonsalient (12.5%) judgments. All remaining
interactions were nonsignificant.
12 Preliminary analysis revealed reliable latency differences between the
two dimensions: texture (1,306 ms) and size (1,194 ms), F1(1, 30) 31.17,
MSE  134,549.04; F2(1, 24)  12.49, MSE  335,751.92. A significant
error-rate difference was also observed between the dimensions (texture:
11.91%; size: 6.06%), F1(1, 30) 12.16, MSE 0.0723; F2(1, 24) 5.87,
MSE  0.1497. However, these differences did not vary reliably with the
levels of the variables included in the main analyses (all ps  .05). Lastly,
comparison latencies and error rates were highly and positively correlated,
indicating no speed–accuracy tradeoff in the data (r  .86).
Table 4
Condition Means (in ms) and Error Rates for Experiment 3B
Distance and
stimulus modality
Salient Nonsalient Mean
M
Error
rate M
Error
rate M
Error
rate
Concrete
Near
Picture 1,251 .070 1,498 .188 1,375 .129
Word 1,229 .133 1,459 .180 1,344 .157
M 1,240 .102 1,479 .184 1,360 .143
Far
Picture 1,061 .008 1,126 .063 1,094 .036
Word 1,110 .023 1,167 .055 1,139 .039
M 1,086 .016 1,147 .059 1,117 .038
Overall 1,163 .059 1,313 .122
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Discussion
The pattern of results revealed in this experiment corroborate
those found in Experiments 1 and 3A, showing that salient at-
tributes speed relatively difficult near comparisons. Put another
way, salient concrete attributes reduced the standard distance ef-
fect. It is important to note that this effect was obtained even when
comparison magnitude was controlled, and thus the potential in-
fluence of a differential serial position effect (see Cˇ ech & Shoben,
2001; Shoben & Wilson, 1998) on the response latencies was
removed. The other important finding is that a picture-superiority
effect was again not evident. This pattern was found in both the
latency and error analyses and provides consistently replicated
support for modality-independent processing of conceptual at-
tributes in symbolic comparisons when nominal control over phys-
ical stimulus characteristics of pictures and words is exercised.
Like Experiment 3A, this independence was revealed under con-
ditions of ample statistical power for comparisons concerning
stimulus modality. To reject the null hypothesis of no modality
difference with an obtained picture–word difference of 75 ms,
power values for concrete salient comparisons were .96 for the
participants analysis and .82 for the concepts analysis; correspond-
ing values for concrete nonsalient comparisons were .73 for the
participants analysis and .88 for the concepts analysis.
General Discussion
The results reported in this study sound a strong cautionary note
for theories of semantic memory with regard to their assumptions
about the advantage of pictorial stimuli in speed of retrieving
semantic information. The findings also have important implica-
tions for dual-coding theory’s treatment of concrete and abstract
information. Finally, the consistent interaction of salience with
distance represents a new finding that warrants consideration. We
discuss each of these findings in turn.
The Picture-Privilege Hypothesis
Prominent theoretical accounts of semantic-memory retrieval
assume that pictures afford privileged access to particular kinds of
information in semantic memory (concrete information; Paivio,
1986) or to semantic memory in general (Banks & Flora, 1977;
Glaser, 1992; Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Potter & Faulconer, 1975).
This broadly accepted assumption is based on a corpus of work in
which pictures produced faster responding than did words on tasks
that require access to semantic memory, such as symbolic com-
parisons, semantic-relatedness judgments, and category decisions
(Glaser, 1992; Paivio, 1975; Potter & Faulconer, 1975; Seifert,
1997; Smith & Magee, 1980). The explanation given by these
researchers for this effect is that pictures need not be named first
to be understood, but words do; thus, even when controlling for
perceptibility across stimulus modality, this difference should per-
sist (see, e.g., Snodgrass, 1984). However, the database supporting
this effect may be subject to artifacts in which the advantage
associated with pictures is a perceptual facilitation afforded by
larger visual angles for the pictorial stimuli than for the word
stimuli (see Theios & Amrhein, 1989b, for details). In line with
this possibility, Theios and Amrhein (1989a, 1989b) showed that
equating the visual angle for pictures and words eliminated latency
differences on various perceptual tasks. Though suggestive, their
data did not directly indicate that modality effects for access of
semantic features would be eliminated if visual angle was tightly
controlled.
The present findings are unambiguous in this regard. With
visual angles equated across picture and word stimuli, pictures did
not facilitate the speed with which symbolic comparisons are
produced. Not only was there an absence of significant modality
effects in four experiments but the overall differences were quite
small, revealing an average difference of only 2 ms (from Exper-
iments 1 and 2: a 9-ms and 6-ms advantage for words; from
Experiment 3A: no difference [0 ms]; and from Experiment 3B: a
7-ms picture advantage). It is important to note that the absence of
a modality effect was observed across a variety of methodological
conditions, including within- and between-participants presenta-
tion of pictures and words, lists composed of abstract and concrete
comparisons, judgments for dimensions differing in salience, and
lists of only concrete comparisons (for which, in some views, the
pictures ought to be especially facilitating; e.g., Paivio, 1978,
1986). Further, the absence of modality effects was confirmed in
analyses with materials as the random variable throughout and
with more than adequate power in Experiments 3A and 3B. Thus,
it is unlikely that the absence of an advantage for pictures rests on
some unique feature of our experimental methodology.
Nor does it appear that the absence of picture superiority is
limited to symbolic-comparison judgments. Using a semantic-
judgment task (item-relation judgments on noncategorically re-
lated items), consistent with our results, Seifert (1997, Experiment
3) reported no advantage for pictures when visual angle was
equated. Using a picture–word interference paradigm, recent stud-
ies (Amrhein & Hamilton, 1997; Hamilton & Amrhein, 1998) have
supported this stimulus-modality independence of variables asso-
ciated with the conceptual organization and retrieval of informa-
tion from semantic memory. In those studies, when distractor
stimuli flanked a target stimulus appearing in a different modality
(e.g., a picture distractor presented on either side of a word target),
substantial interference was observed when the distractors and
target were categorically related and the task required translation
of that target (i.e., either drawing from a word target or writing
from a picture target). It is important to note that the magnitude of
this interference did not vary with the modalities of the distractors
or target. That is, the same interference increment was obtained
when picture distractors flanked a word target and when word
distractors flanked a picture target. Taken together, these results
strongly suggest a reexamination of the empirical literature that
has spurred theoretical assumptions about pictorial advantages in
access of semantic memory. As a start, arguments for a temporally
more direct route for word access or a less direct route for picture
access to semantic memory should be considered (see, e.g.,
Snodgrass, 1984; Theios & Amrhein, 1989b).
A brief consideration of past categorization and symbolic-
comparison studies raises several concerns about the reliability and
validity of the picture advantage reported. First, the effect is not as
consistent as may be assumed, with some experiments reporting it
(e.g., Banks & Flora, 1977; Durso & Johnson, 1979; Glaser &
Dungelhoff, 1984; Nelson et al., 1977; Pellegrino, Rosinski,
Chiesi, & Siegel, 1977; Potter & Faulconer, 1975; Seifert, 1997;
Snodgrass & McCullough, 1986) but not others (Harris, Morris, &
Bassett, 1977; Nelson et al., 1977; Smith & Magee, 1980;
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Snodgrass & McCullough, 1986; Theios & Amrhein, 1989b).
More critically, interpretation of this equivocal evidence is often
hampered by incomplete or nonstandardized specification of the
physical characteristics of the picture and word stimuli used in
terms of subtended visual angle and stimulus area (compare, e.g.,
Durso & Johnson, 1979; Nelson et al., 1977; Seifert, 1997; and
Theios & Amrhein, 1989b), although a size advantage for pictures
is readily inferable from some stimulus descriptions (e.g., Pelle-
grino et al., 1977) or is given directly by some sample stimulus
depictions (e.g., Banks & Flora, 1977; Glaser & Dungelhoff, 1984;
Smith & Magee, 1980).
A second potential methodological confound is the possible
perceptual similarity present in pictures but not words. For exam-
ple, in her Experiment 2, Seifert (1997) contrasted two types of
attribute-stimulus pairs: external and internal. External attributes
are concrete and perceptually verifiable in their pictorial form (at
least for a given set of stimuli) (e.g., finger–hand, stripes–tiger),
whereas internal attributes, although also concrete, are not so
perceptually verifiable (e.g., springs–couch, wires–toaster). In a
verification task in which both types of attribute trials were inter-
mixed, “yes” responses were faster for pictures than words for both
attribute types. Although the picture advantage for external at-
tributes is likely due to facilitated perceptual, rather than concep-
tual, analysis of the pictorial stimuli (see Seifert, 1997; Snodgrass
& McCullough, 1986), this picture advantage was presumed to be
more conceptual for the internal attributes. However, a number of
the internal attributes were actually perceptually verifiable in the
pictorial stimuli used by Seifert, such as pupil–eye, gills–fish, and
nostril–nose (see Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980, for correspond-
ing pictures). Given that only 18 internal attribute stimuli were
used, it is possible that the picture advantage found by Seifert for
this condition was due to the same facilitated perceptual process-
ing for pictures that led to the results of the external attribute
condition, rather than to an advantage for pictures in accessing
conceptual information.
A final troubling feature of the picture-superiority-effect litera-
ture is that often the apparent finding of a difference favoring
pictures over words is not accompanied by the report of a direct
statistical test (see, e.g., Bajo, 1988; Durso & Johnson, 1979;
Potter & Faulconer, 197513). In addition, only recently have sta-
tistical tests using participants and stimulus items–concepts as
error estimates been reported for this stimulus-modality compari-
son (e.g., Seifert, 1997). In sum, the present study, other recent
evidence, and methodological confounds in some past studies pose
a serious challenge to the common theoretical claim that pictures
afford privileged access to semantic information in general.
Dual-Coding Theory
The dual-coding theory of semantic memory assumes that words
are afforded faster access to abstract semantic information than are
pictures (Paivio, 1986). One objective of the present study was to
examine this assumption in more detail than has been previously
attempted. In Experiments 1 and 2, even for abstract salient fea-
tures that presumably would be directly stored in a putative lin-
guistic system, words did not confer a significant advantage over
pictures. Indeed, there was no influence of modality on the
symbolic-comparison task, suggesting that access to featural in-
formation about concepts in semantic memory may have little
dependence on stimulus modality. Most fundamental for dual-
coding theory is the idea that concrete features are represented in
a nonverbal (imaginal) code or format in semantic memory, a code
that is not available for abstract features. This central assumption
of dual-coding theory, along with the assumption that pictures
should favor access to the imaginal code, firmly predicts a picture-
superiority effect for concrete target information. Yet, in two
experiments (Experiments 3A and 3B) that focused only on con-
crete features—and evidenced ample statistical power—no effect
of stimulus modality on comparison latencies was observed.
The Distance Effect
Less central to the main thrust of the current study was the
unexpected finding that salient features showed a significantly
diminished distance effect relative to nonsalient features. As men-
tioned earlier, one possibility is that salient near comparisons may
have reflected extreme positions on the target dimension, whereas
nonsalient near comparisons reflected more intermediate positions
on the dimension. As mentioned earlier, extreme pairs tend to be
responded to more quickly than intermediate pairs (Cˇ ech & Sho-
ben, 2001; Moyer & Dumais, 1978; Shoben & Wilson, 1998).
Thus, the interaction revealed in Experiments 1 and 3A might have
been due to salient near pairs being facilitated because they fell at
the extreme of their dimensions (cf. Shoben & Wilson, 1998).
However, this possibility seems unlikely given that in Experiment
3B we again found this interaction even when we expressly
equated the dimension-magnitude serial positions of the concept
pairs for salient and nonsalient comparisons. Barring some unfore-
seen additional artifact, the present modulation of the distance
effect may represent an important extension to the symbolic-
comparison literature (see also Sailor & Shoben, 2000, for the
attenuation of distance effects for part–whole pairs in a paired-
comparison task).
Although we know of no account from the symbolic-
comparison literature for this particular—apparently robust—find-
ing, one possible explanation is that salient features can be cate-
gorized more quickly in terms of the anchors of the target
dimension (e.g., smaller or larger); categorization speed is related
to symbolic-comparison latencies (Shoben & Wilson, 1998),
which would accordingly provide a general advantage for salient
attributes. This interpretation, however, would not clarify why the
advantage for salient attributes is amplified on near relative to far
comparisons.
Summary
Given the findings reported here and by Theios and Amrhein
(1989b), Amrhein and Hamilton (1997), and Hamilton and Am-
rhein (1998), we believe that the presence of the picture “advan-
tage” in the literature has benefited from two primary methodolog-
ical confounds: physical stimulus size (Theios & Amrhein, 1989a,
13 In the classic Potter and Faulconer (1975) article, the apparent picture
advantage over words in their categorization task is supported by separate
sign tests of the proportion of participant and concept items exhibiting the
effect in the same direction. However, using their reported standard error
of the mean difference, one finds that this advantage is nonsignificant by
the more conventional matched-samples t test.
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1989b) and featural diagnosticity (Snodgrass & McCullough,
1986). Our findings indicate that under reasonable constraints in
which (a) horizontal visual angles are equivalent for picture and
word stimuli (and fall below 8°), (b) their vertical visual angles are
roughly equivalent (and fall below 6°14), (c) their areas are roughly
equivalent, and (d) featural diagnosticity is controlled for picture
stimuli, stimulus modality does not reliably influence the time to
contact conceptual meaning. Finally, the absence of Modality 
Feature Concreteness interactions under these properly controlled
conditions counters views that posit different representational for-
mats for concrete relative to abstract features (e.g., dual-coding
theory).
14 See, for example, Johnson, Keltner, and Balestrery (1978) on the
different horizontal and vertical limits of the visual field.
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Appendix
Stimulus Pairs for Experiment 1
Concept pair Concreteness Salience Distance Dimension Adjective
Correct
response
List 1
lizard–porcupine Concrete Salient Near Texture Rougher Right
gorilla–walrus Concrete Nonsalient Near Texture Softer Left
lobster–sheep Concrete Salient Far Texture Softer Right
rhino–bear Concrete Nonsalient Far Texture Rougher Left
hummingbird–snail Concrete Salient Near Size Smaller Right
alligator–pig Concrete Nonsalient Near Size Larger Left
duck–cow Concrete Salient Far Size Larger Right
owl–panda Concrete Nonsalient Far Size Smaller Left
kangaroo–penguin Abstract Salient Near Ferocity Meeker Right
bee–horse Abstract Nonsalient Near Ferocity Fiercer Left
deer–leopard Abstract Salient Far Ferocity Fiercer Right
frog–fox Abstract Nonsalient Far Ferocity Meeker Left
beaver–dolphin Abstract Salient Near Intelligence Smarter Right
worm–snake Abstract Nonsalient Near Intelligence Dumber Left
dog–chicken Abstract Salient Far Intelligence Dumber Right
cat–turtle Abstract Nonsalient Far Intelligence Smarter Left
List 2
rabbit–squirrel Concrete Salient Near Texture Softer Left
robin–giraffe Concrete Nonsalient Near Texture Rougher Right
lobster–sheep Concrete Salient Far Texture Rougher Left
rhino–bear Concrete Nonsalient Far Texture Softer Right
elephant–moose Concrete Salient Near Size Larger Left
donkey–goat Concrete Nonsalient Near Size Smaller Right
duck–cow Concrete Salient Far Size Smaller Left
owl–panda Concrete Nonsalient Far Size Larger Right
lion–wolf Abstract Salient Near Ferocity Fiercer Left
eagle–fly Abstract Nonsalient Near Ferocity Meeker Right
deer–leopard Abstract Salient Far Ferocity Meeker Left
frog–fox Abstract Nonsalient Far Ferocity Fiercer Right
ostrich–camel Abstract Salient Near Intelligence Dumber Left
grasshopper–mouse Abstract Nonsalient Near Intelligence Smarter Right
dog–chicken Abstract Salient Far Intelligence Smarter Left
cat–turtle Abstract Nonsalient Far Intelligence Dumber Right
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